Posts Tagged ‘lis pendens’

Land Registration Ordinance: a lis pendens involves a claim to a proprietary interest

January 27, 2016

In Wide Power Corp Ltd v Manhattan Court (IO) ([2015] 4 HKLRD 480, CFI) the incorporated owners of a building sought an injunction requiring an owner to remove unauthorised building works carried out in breach of the DMC. They registered the claim as a lis pendens. The owner successfully argued that the counterclaim did not relate to land or any interest or charge on land and so did not fall within the definition of a lis pendens in section 1A of the Land Registration Ordinance. A lis pendens must involve a claim to a proprietary interest or right in real property (Louis Chan J. at [76]). Here, the claim was an in personam claim against the owner. If the owner were to sell the property, the new owner would not be affected by the proceedings against the former owner. He would, of course, be liable under the terms of the DMC but this would involve a fresh claim against the new owner.

Michael Lower


A lis pendens must affect land

December 23, 2015

In Luen Ford Industrial Co Ltd v Woo Ming Han Juliana ([2015] HKEC 2639, CFI) D alleged that her father had procured her late mother’s execution of a transfer of the mother’s shares in a company (‘the parent company’) through the exercise of undue influence.  Her primary claim was for a declaration that the transfer was null and void. A subsidiary of the parent company (‘the subsidiary’) owned an industrial unit (‘the property’). D also sought orders preventing the subsidiary from selling the property or, alternatively, from disposing of the proceeds of sale. D’s solicitor registered the writ as a lis pendens against the property.

Deputy Judge Kenneth Kwok SC  ordered the registration to be vacated pursuant to section 19 of the Land Registration Ordinance. He referred to Thian’s Plastics Industrial Company Limited v Tin’s Chemical Industrial Company Limited and Anstalt Nybro v HK Resort Company Limited. This litigation did not affect land. There was no action against the owner of the land (the subsidiary). The action concerned the father and the parent company and their future conduct. The claim for an injunction to restrain the sale of the land was an artifice designed to give the appearance that there was a claim affecting land:

‘The registration was a blatant tactical move to bring about a standstill in the sale of the Subject Property. What is objectionable is that Juliana Woo and her then solicitors did not seek judicial approval to achieve her objective. Instead, they simply abused the registration system.’ ([33])

The alternative claim restraining the disposal of the sale proceeds was adequate protection for D.

The judgment closes with this warning:

‘Registration of a lis pendens is a clog on the owner’s title. Those who act in concert to procure registration of a lis which does not affect land should beware of possible liability.’ ([36])

Costs were awarded against D on an indemnity basis.

Michael Lower

The court’s power to vacate a lis pendens

December 2, 2015

In Join Win Holdings Ltd v City Target Ltd ([2015] HKEC 2477, CA) the first instance judge dismissed P’s claim for a declaration that it had entered into an oral contract for the acquisition of D1’s property and for specific performance of that contract. There was no writing to satisfy section 3(1) of the Conveyancing and Property Ordinance and part performance had not been pleaded. The judge had also ordered that the lis pendens registered at the Land Registry be vacated. P appealed against this judgment and registered the notice of appeal as a lis pendens at the Land Registry. D1 successfully applied for the vacation of the notice of appeal from the Land Registry.

The Court of Appeal (Cheung JA giving the only full judgment) referred to the court’s power under section 19 of the Land Registration Ordinance to order the vacation of a lis pendens when it is satisfied that ‘the litigation is not prosecuted bona fide, or for other good cause shown.’ It also pointed to its inherent jurisdiction to order the vacation of a registration.

In deciding whether or not to vacate the registration, the court had to assess the merits of the appeal. This appeal was doomed to fail given the lack of any writing to satisfy section 3(1) ([2.11]). ‘The notice of appeal should never have been registered because putting the plaintiff’s case at its highest it is not one that can be said to affect the property.’ ([2.16]).

Michael Lower