Posts Tagged ‘licences’

Exclusive possession and property guardians

February 21, 2020

In Camelot Guardian Management Ltd v Khoo ([2018] EWHC 2296) the court had to consider whether an agreement with a ‘property guardian’ created a lease or a licence.

Facts

Westminster City Council (‘the council’) appointed Camelot Guardian Management Ltd (‘CGML’) to provide security services in respect of a temporarily empty office building (‘the property’). This agreement envisaged that CGML would grant licences to suitable guardians and carry out regular inspections of the property until the council wanted it back.

CGML entered into an agreement (‘the agreement’) with Mr Khoo giving him the right to occupy a room in the property.

The agreement had a number of features designed to emphasise that it created a licence and was not a tenancy:

  1.  it was headed ‘licence agreement’;
  2.  it included an ‘important note’ emphasising that Mr Khoo would share the property with others;
  3.  it recorded CGML’s agreement with the council concerning the property;
  4.  Mr Khoo could choose a room but could be required to move to another room by CGML;
  5.  Mr Khoo could change the room he used but had to notify CGML of the change;
  6.  Mr. Khoo could not have visitors stay overnight.

In August 2017 the council gave notice to CGML that it would shortly require the property back. CGML served notice to determine Mr. Khoo’s licence. Mr. Khoo refused to move out and claimed to be an assured shorthold tenant. It was agreed that if Mr Khoo was a tenant then he was an assured shorthold tenant and the claim for possession should be dismissed.

Legal analysis

Butcher J. explained that after  Street v Mountford ([1985] 1 AC 809) the court had to consider whether, properly interpreted, the agreement conferred exclusive possession on the occupier.

Construction of the agreement involves looking at the words used in the light of the relevant background. The court should be astute to detect a sham: it should be alert to the possibility that the words used were a dishonest attempt to mislead as to the true substance of the agreement between the parties. When considering the question of a sham the court was entitled to look at how the parties behaved after the agreement was reached.

Butcher J concluded that Mr Khoo did not have exclusive possession and was not a tenant.

The terms described above all pointed in this direction. CGML’s agreement with the council and its underlying purpose were part of the relevant background ([28] – [29]). The circumstances surrounding the agreement (the language used in the website and the fact that Mr Khoo was shown a particular room) were part of the background but did not detract from the conclusion that this was a licence.

On the idea of a sham, Butcher J. observed that:

it has to be borne in mind that not every departure from the terms of a contract and how it is operated indicates that the relevant agreement was a pretence when entered into. Furthermore, the fact that a contractual right is not exercised does not of itself mean that it ceases to exist. The relevant party may be entitled subsequently to insist on its performance nevertheless’ ([33]).

There was no sham, no ‘element of dishonesty’ here ([34] – [36]).

Michael Lower

 

 

Developer’s informal allocation of private parking space in the common area

May 20, 2017

In Faraday House (IO) v Shine Wheel Ltd ([2017] HKEC 957, LT) P was the purchaser of a flat in Faraday House in 1992. The estate was then a new development and she bought from the developer. She wanted three car parking spaces. Two of the spaces she was offered were allocated as private car parking spaces. The third space (‘the Adjacent Space’) was next to these spaces but was in the common area of the development.

The selling agent assured P that he would arrange for the developer to expressly acknowledge her right to use the Adjacent Space as a private car parking space (‘the Assurance’). P paid HK$250,000 for the two ‘official’ spaces and HK$50,000 for the Adjacent Space.

The Adjacent Space was never re-designated as an area for P’s exclusive use but P was issued with a Permission Letter allowing her to use the space. She was given three car parking permits. The owners incorporated in 1996 and a new manager was appointed at that time.

P used the three spaces for sixteen years until 2014. The owners’ corporation then demanded that she cease using the Adjacent Space. When P refused to comply, the corporation brought proceedings seeking an injunction preventing P from parking in the Adjacent Space. Parking in the common areas was a breach of the DMC.

The Lands Tribunal (Judge Kot) started from the proposition that the Permission Letter to use the Adjacent Space was a licence. The developer could not have granted a licence over the Adjacent Space since it had already been designated as a common area; the licence was invalid. Even if it were valid, it would be revocable; there were no equitable grounds for restraining this revocation. Even if it were irrevocable, it would not bind the IO which took over control of the common parts in 1996.

Promissory estoppel, the principles of which were most recently articulated in Hong Kong in Luo Xing Juan v Estate of Hui Shui See ((2009) 12 HKCFAR 1) could not help. The IO were not bound by an assurance given by the developer. The act of allowing P to park in the Adjacent Space for many years could be seen as an assurance. P had not, however, incurred any detriment in reliance on this (the HK$50,000 having already been paid).

Acquiescence was a possible defence given the nature of the covenants that had been broken. There had been an assurance or lying by on the part of the owners. It was not, however, unjust in all the circumstances to grant the injunction sought. P had had the benefit of the Adjacent Space over many years and would not be caused any hardship.

Michael Lower

A lease for an uncertain term granted to an individual is a lease for life

November 15, 2011

A lease for an uncertain term (or a periodic tenancy where the right to serve notice to quit is subject to an indeterminate, invalid fetter) created a lease for life at common law. This was so whether or not the parties intended a lease for life. In England, a lease for life takes effect as a lease for 90 years (Law of Property Act 1925, s. 149(6)). Contractual effect (binding only on the parties) is to be given to a licence agreement that cannot take effect as a lease (because of uncertainty of term). This is so even if the parties thought that they were creating a lease. Similarly, contractual effect (binding only on the parties) can be given to an invalid, indeterminate fetter on the right to serve a notice to determine a periodic tenancy.

In Mexfield Housing Co-operative Ltd v Berrisford ([2011] UKSC 52) M entered into an occupancy agreement with B. B could determine it by serving a month’s notice. M could only terminate it in the event of B’s default or in the event of her ceasing to be a member of M. M purported to terminate it by serving one month’s notice. It argued that the agreement was an ineffective attempt to create a lease. It was ineffective, it was argued, because of the lack of certainty attached to the landlord’s right to determine the agreement. M argued that the result was that B occupied under a periodic tenancy that could be brought to an end by notice to quit.

The Supreme Court reluctantly accepted (and B conceded) that this was a lease for an uncertain term. When granted to an individual, however, common law deemed this to be a lease for life. This seems to have accorded with the parties’ intentions in this case but the result would be the same even if this were not the case. The Law of Property Act 1925, s.149(6) converted a lease for life into a lease for a term of ninety years subject to the parties’ rights to bring it to an end in certain events by notice to quit.

Even if this had not been the case, the agreement could have taken effect as a contractual licence even if the parties had intended to create a lease. Lord Neuberger left open the question as to whether it could have taken effect as a periodic tenancy (had this accorded with the parties’ intentions) with contractual effect being given (as between the contracting parties) to the restrictions on the right to serve a notice to quit found in the agreement between M and B ([69]).

The Supreme Court was highly critical of the certainty of term principle but did not overrule earlier authorities that laid it down as an essential element of a lease.

Michael Lower